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RESEARCH STATEMENT

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I am an empirical macroeconomist studying how heterogeneity in perceptions and information processing affects the transmission of macroeconomic policy. My research starts from the premise that policy effects depend not only on what policymakers do and communicate, but also on who pays attention, how private agents interpret policy signals, and what risks they perceive. Many empirical analyses of policy transmission rely on aggregate measures that obscure this heterogeneity. My work instead uses direct measures of firms' and households' information environments to study how differences in attention, perceived risk, and beliefs affect real economic decisions.

A common feature of my research is the use of new data to measure aspects of expectations that have traditionally been difficult to observe. I construct these measures with large-scale natural-language analysis of corporate earnings calls and policy communication. To study transmission, I use a broad set of macroeconometric methods for time-series and panel data, including high-frequency identification of policy shocks, local projections, and firm-level and cross-country panel estimation. I also use survey experiments to measure economic agents' perceptions about macroeconomic policies. My dissertation develops measures of firm attention and perceived risk, together with firm-based measures of fiscal perceptions, and shows that these dimensions systematically shape monetary and fiscal policy transmission. Related work extends this approach to household belief formation and, increasingly, to the decisions and communication of policymakers themselves. My broader objective is to move expectations and information processing from latent assumptions in macroeconomic analysis toward objects that can be directly measured and incorporated into the study of policy transmission.

1. Firm Heterogeneity and Investment Responses to Monetary Policy

My job market paper, *Decoding Unconventional Monetary Policy: The Role of Firm-Level Heterogeneity*, studies heterogeneity in firm investment responses to conventional and unconventional monetary policy. Forward guidance is now a central policy tool, yet standard models often predict aggregate responses far larger than those observed in the data, the forward guidance puzzle. I approach the question from the point of view of firms: if responding to policy communication requires firms to process information about the future policy path, heterogeneous attention may shape which firms respond.

I focus on two sources of firm heterogeneity. The first is attention to monetary policy, which I measure as the share of each quarterly earnings conference call devoted to the topic. The second is balance-sheet position, which governs a firm's capacity to respond to changes in financing conditions. I then study how these characteristics affect investment responses to three types of monetary policy shocks, identified in the literature from high-frequency asset-price movements around FOMC announcements: conventional shocks to the current policy rate; Odyssean forward guidance, which commits the central bank to a future policy path; and Delphic forward guidance, which conveys its assessment of economic fundamentals. I estimate these responses with local projections, so the estimates capture how the same firm's response changes when its attention or balance-sheet position is above its own average. To characterize the content of these announcements directly, I also use large language models to classify FOMC statements and document how their Odyssean and Delphic content changes over time.

The results show that monetary policy does not transmit through a single firm-level channel, and that the pattern of heterogeneity depends on the informational content of the shock. For conventional policy and Delphic guidance, differential responses are associated primarily with balance-sheet position, with a limited role for attention. Odyssean guidance shows the opposite pattern: a firm responds relatively more when

its attention to monetary policy is high, while balance-sheet position plays a limited role. Attention and balance-sheet position therefore represent distinct margins of heterogeneity in transmission, and which margin matters depends on the information contained in the policy action.

A parsimonious theoretical framework in which firms differ in attention and financial fragility rationalizes this asymmetry. Conventional rate changes and Delphic information are reflected in prices and other public signals, so firms can act on them without processing the announcement itself. Odyssean commitments also move prices, but in addition require firms to process the central bank's message and infer what it implies for future financing conditions: that borrowing costs will remain low even as the economy improves, an inference attentive firms make more readily. The framework also suggests a possible resolution of the forward guidance puzzle, one that requires distinguishing between types of guidance and the firm characteristics that govern their transmission. The aggregate effect of forward guidance depends on its mix of commitment and information content and on how attention and balance-sheet positions are distributed across firms. If many firms are inattentive to commitments, for example, the aggregate response to Odyssean guidance can be substantially smaller than representative-agent models predict, and communication that makes commitments salient to more firms could amplify their real effects.

A companion paper, *Firm-Level Risk Perceptions and the Transmission of Monetary Policy Shocks*, asks whether the risks firms perceive condition their response to monetary easing. Using text-based risk measures from earnings calls, I find that firms reporting greater perceived risk accumulate less capital following expansionary shocks, even after controlling for financial frictions and firm sentiment. Attention and perceived risk are therefore separate channels of monetary transmission.

2. Firm Perceptions and the Transmission of Fiscal Policy

A second strand of my research extends this measurement to fiscal policy in an international setting. In *Fiscal Assessments Through the Lens of Firms: Corporate Perceptions and the Transmission of Fiscal Policy*, joint with Leandro Andrian and Oscar Valencia of the Inter-American Development Bank, we apply natural-language processing to more than 390,000 corporate earnings calls from about 14,000 firms in 51 countries over two decades to construct Fiscal Perceptions Indicators. The indicators capture the incidence of fiscal discussion, the extent to which fiscal issues are framed as risks, and the sentiment expressed toward the fiscal environment, providing a high-frequency and internationally comparable measure of private-sector fiscal perceptions.

Periods of elevated fiscal concern are associated with higher sovereign spreads, weaker investment, and slower output growth. Combining the indicators with externally identified government-spending shocks in panel local projections, we find that fiscal transmission varies with firm sentiment: more favorable sentiment is associated with smaller increases in sovereign spreads and stronger responses of private demand. In a horse race that also interacts the shocks with the initial debt-to-GDP ratio and the initial sovereign spread, the sentiment interaction remains economically and statistically important. Firm perceptions therefore contain information about the state dependence of fiscal transmission that conventional fiscal-stress measures do not capture. Because fiscal adjustments may transmit differently depending on how firms perceive them, the way governments communicate these adjustments, and the credibility of that communication, can potentially play an important role in their real effects.

3. Household Beliefs and the Interpretation of Policy

The role of heterogeneous perceptions extends beyond firms. In *How Partisanship Shapes Economic Expectations: Evidence from the 2025 U.S. Tariff Announcement*, joint with Taewon Hwang and Yoon Joo Jo and currently Revise and Resubmit at the *European Economic Review*, we fielded a survey experiment immediately after the April 2025 U.S. tariff announcement. Respondents reported their expectations and their subjective models of how tariffs affect the economy. We then randomly provided evidence from the 2018–2019 U.S.–China tariff episode.

Political affiliation explains disagreement in subjective models beyond standard demographic characteristics, and the effect of information depends on these priors. When respondents agree on the direction of an effect, information changes its perceived magnitude; when prior models differ more fundamentally, information also changes the perceived mechanism and direction. Identical information can therefore narrow disagreement for some outcomes and widen it for others. Heterogeneous interpretation is not specific to firms: common policy information can produce persistently different expectations whenever agents begin from different models of the economy.

4. Ongoing Research and Broader Agenda

A complementary branch of my research turns to the supply side: the institutions that make and communicate policy. In *Fiscal–Monetary Interaction and Government Debt Management*, joint with Sarah Zubairy and Huixin Bi, we study how the U.S. Treasury chooses the maturity structure of government debt. Debt managers trade off lower expected financing costs against rollover and interest-rate risk. We recover the implicit weights policymakers place on these objectives, study whether they vary with the macroeconomic environment, and ask how Treasury issuance interacts with Federal Reserve asset purchases, which change the effective maturity structure of consolidated government liabilities. The project extends my text-based approach to the stated objectives of policymakers.

A second line of future research deepens the measurement of beliefs. In *Firm Narratives and the Propagation of Macroeconomic Shocks*, I move from measuring how much firms discuss an issue toward measuring the narratives they use to make sense of shocks: why a shock matters, through which mechanisms it reaches the business, and how the firm plans to respond. Using earnings calls and 10-K filings, I will study how these narratives form, spread across firms and sectors, and interact with attention and perceived risk. If firms share an interpretation of a shock, their responses may become correlated and amplify aggregate fluctuations, while competing narratives may weaken transmission.

Across these projects, the question organizing my research is how policy communication, and the way private agents process it, should be incorporated into macroeconomic analysis. Text, survey, and high-frequency data increasingly make it possible to observe what policymakers communicate and how firms and households interpret it in real time. My goal is to use these data to move the expectations channel from an assumption to a measured input that helps explain when monetary and fiscal policies are powerful, when their effects are muted, and why similar policy actions can have different real effects.

Research Papers

[1] *Decoding Unconventional Monetary Policy: The Role of Firm-Level Heterogeneity* (Job Market Paper). Sole-authored.
[2] *Firm-Level Risk Perceptions and the Transmission of Monetary Policy Shocks*. Sole-authored.
[3] *Fiscal Assessments Through the Lens of Firms: Corporate Perceptions and the Transmission of Fiscal Policy*, with Leandro Andrian (IDB) and Oscar Valencia (IDB).
[4] *How Partisanship Shapes Economic Expectations: Evidence from the 2025 U.S. Tariff Announcement*, with Taewon Hwang (Texas A&M) and Yoon Joo Jo (Texas A&M). Revise and Resubmit at the *European Economic Review*.

Selected Work in Progress

[5] *Fiscal–Monetary Interaction and Government Debt Management (Treasury Issuance Strategy)*, with Sarah Zubairy (Texas A&M) and Huixin Bi (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City).
[6] *Firm Narratives and the Propagation of Macroeconomic Shocks*. Sole-authored.